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NOTES
THE DOCTRINE OF ANTICIPATORY BREACH REVISITED-DOES
UNNECESSARY CONFUSION STILL EXIST?
Plaintiff, a seller of timber, and defendant buyer entered into a
contract of sale which was conditioned on plaintiff's obtaining a right-of-
way so that defendant could remove the timber to a public road. Having
obtained the right-of-way, plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant requesting
performance, to which defendant replied that it considered the contract
invalid. In affirming a district court judgment for plaintiff granting specif-
ic performance of the contract the court of appeals rejected defendant's
claim that he had not been adequately placed in default and held that an
anticipatory breach of contract is actionable in Louisiana. Lawton v.
Louisiana Pacific Corp., 344 So. 2d 1129 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1977).
It is often contended that there is no civilian counterpart to the
common law doctrine of anticipatory breach.' This, however, is not
exactly so.
At common law an anticipatory breach of contract is a repudiation by
a promisor of his obligation before the time for his performance has
arrived. Unless the promisor has some legal justification for repudiating,
any definite statement made to the promisee that he will not or cannot
perform his contract operates as an anticipatory breach.2 Thus, a contrac-
tor who realizes he has unprofitably underbid a job and notifies the owner
of his intention not to build at the accepted price has committed an
anticipatory breach of contract. Similarly, any voluntary act by an obligor
which renders his performance impossible constitutes an anticipatory
breach. 3
The doctrine of anticipatory breach was a departure from older and
stricter legal theory. If the law of contracts is the law of promises, a
promisor cannot breach a contract unless he fails to perform as promised,
1. 5 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1337(A) (rev. ed. 1937); Comment, The
Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach of Contract, 20 LA. L. REv. 119 (1959); Comment,
Anticipatory Breach In Louisiana, 7 TUL. L. REv. 586 (1933).
2. 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 959 (1951), and authorities cited therein.
3. Id. Such a situation arises when a vendor sells to a third party that which he
has already promised to another, for such an act amounts to a positive manifesta-
tion of intention not to perform the first contract.
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and such a failure can only occur at the time and under the conditions
specified in the contract. However, existing law in England and the United
States has evolved otherwise, creating a duty on the promisor not only to
perform when the term arrives, but also to refrain from repudiating his
promise beforehand. 4 This apparent inconsistency is better explained by
policy considerations than by the theoretical duty not to foresake one's
promise. 5
Once the common law recognized that an obligor could anticipatorily
breach his contract, the courts began to formulate a set of legal conse-
quences flowing from the breach. It was early established that the obligee
could sue immediately, and could discontinue his own performance under
the contract without prejudicing his right of action against the obligor.6
The leading English case on anticipatory breach was Hochster v. De la
Tour.7 The parties entered into a contract in April, 1852, which bound
plaintiff to three months of employment starting on June 1. On May 11
defendant totally repudiated the contract, and plaintiff sued on May 22.
Terming the suit premature, defendant argued that the repudiation was
only an offer to rescind, which could be retracted until the date of
performance, and that until that time plaintiff had to be ready to perform.
The court disagreed, however, and allowed the suit, by reasoning that
requiring plaintiff to stand ready to perform would effectively eliminate
his ability to mitigate damages by seeking other employment.8 Although
4. Id.
5. Id. Before the doctrine of anticipatory breach arose, the preferred theory
was that a person could be bound only by the expression of his own will, and that
there could be no legal duty to be enforced against him beyond the terms of his own
consensual promise. This may account for the many statements that "logically" or
"in the nature of things" there can be no breach of contract except by failure to
perform something that was promised. In any society as social conditions change,
personal liberty must necessarily be limited. The legal rights and duties growing out
of and regarded as a part of "contract" are determined more by the needs of all,
and less by the mere will of the contractor. See id.
6. Id. See Central Trust Co. of Ill. v. Chicago Auditorium, 240 U.S. 581, 589
(1916).
7. [1853] Q.B. 678. See discussion in 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 960. See
also 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1313.
8. 4 A. CORBIN, supra note 2, § 960. Williston notes another early English rule
as formulated in the case of Frost v. Knight, L.R. 7 Ex. 11, 112 (1872). The
essence of this rule was that the obligee had his choice of course of action: he could
either ignore the obligor's repudiation and continue with his own performance, thus
holding the obligor responsible for all the consequences of non-performance, or he
could assume the repudiation to be a wrongful termination of the contract, and at
once bring his action for breach. Although Williston takes issue with the reasoning
of both of these alternatives, he shows that the first alternative was rejected in the
United States by a line of cases, beginning in 1845, which held that after an absolute
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some writers have argued that the duty to mitigate damages does not
necessitate an immediate cause of action by plaintiff, the doctrine of the
Hochster case has received wide acceptance in most Anglo-American
jurisdictions. 9
Many civil law scholars believe anticipatory breach to be of dubious
value for the civil law because most civilian systems require the obligor to
be placed in default as a prerequisite to his liability. 0 It has been suggest-
ed that the civilian preference for specific performance as a remedy for
breach of contract, as opposed to the common law preference for dam-
ages, delayed recognition of the doctrine until comparatively recent
times." Granting specific performance of an agreement prior to the time
for its performance was considered illogical.' 2
repudiation or refusal to perform by one party, the'other party cannoi continue to
perform and recover damages based on full performance. This result adheres to the
rule that an injured party has no right to recover for subsequent performance if
damages will be thereby enhanced, even though he is not required to bring an
immediate suit but can wait until the time for performance has elapsed. 5 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1297-98. Also it should be noted that at common law
today if the obligee elects to wait until the stated time for performance, the obligor
has the option to retract his repudiation before a change of position by the injured
party makes his performance more burdensome. Id.
9. Only Massachusetts and Nebraska seem to have been slow in adopting the
doctrine. For years the Massachusetts case of Daniels v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530
(1874), expressed that state's vigorous rejection of the rule of Hochster. However,
with the adoption of the U.C.C. both Massachusetts and Nebraska have officially
accepted the law of anticipatory breach. See the Massachusetts Annotations to
MASS. ANN. LAWS, ch. 106, § 2-610 (U.C.C.-Michie/Law. Co-op 1976).
10. See Baudouin, La sanction de l'inexecution du contrat y compris 'l'An-
ticipatory Breach', 1966 REVUE DE L'ASSOCIATION QUEBECOISE POUR L'ETUDE COM-
PARATIVE DU DROIT 53, 61. See also L.-J. CONSTANTINESCO, INEXECUTION ET FAUTE
CONTRACTUELLE EN DROIT COMPARE128 (1960); B. GILSON, INEXECUTION ET RESO-
LUTION EN DROIT ANGLAIS 57 (1969), cited in 2 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS § 238 in 7
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 449 (1975).
11. 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note I, § 1337(A).
12. Id. Accordingly, anticipatory breach has found little support in France. In
G. MADRAY, DES CONTRATS D'APRES LA RECENTE CODIFICATION PRIVEE FAITE AUX
ITATS UNIS 141 (1935), the author says of the doctrine of anticipatory breach that
"it is surprising in view of the extreme powers which it gives to the creditor: it
seems that such Draconian provisions can never be introduced into our laws." 5 S.
WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1337(A). However, Williston states that in Germany the
publication of a famous essay in 1902 by Hermann Staub on "Positive Breaches of
Contract" has lent considerable weight to the acceptance of the doctrine in that
country. H. STAUB, FESTSCHRIFT FUER DEN DEUTSCHEN JURISTENTAG 29 (1902).
Williston explains that Staub used the principles of good faith as a basis for an
elaborate theory of "secondary duties," holding a promisor bound not only to do
what he has promised in express words but also to many other things to which he
must be understood to have bound himself "in good faith." Any violation of such
19771
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The doctrine of anticipatory breach has received cursory and often
confused treatment in Louisiana. In response to the case of Aronson v.
Klein 13 the first significant analysis of the problem appeared in a law
review comment in 1933.14 The author argued that allowing an immediate
suit for an anticipatory breach amounts to an acceleration of the term,
which violates article 2052 of the Civil Code.15 The author postulated that
an injured party cannot sue for damages on a contract until the term of the
contract expires. An appeal was made to the Louisiana courts not to yield
to common law influence when dealing with this contractual problem, but
instead to resort to civilian techniques in analysis of the Code. 6
In 1958 the Supreme Court of Louisiana in Marek v. McHardy7 held
that an anticipatory breach of contract was actionable. The court discussed
at length the major remedy for breach of contract in Louisiana, in an
apparent attempt to refute the observation that the civil law should reject
the doctrine of anticipatory breach because of the preference for specific
performance as a remedy in actions ex contractu. 18 Consequently, the
court inaccurately concluded that, at least in obligations to do, damages
are the preferred remedy in Louisiana and that the doctrine of anticipatory
breach was available to plaintiff.' 9
A year after the Marek decision, another law review comment
"subsidiary duties" is a "positive breach of contract" which immediately gives rise
to a duty to make compensation for the loss suffered by the obligee.
13. 175 La. 506, 143 So. 389 (1932).
14. See Anticipatory Breach in Louisiana, supra note I, at 586.
15. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2052: "What is due only at a certain time, can not be
demanded before the expiration of the intermediate time; but what has been paid in
advance can not be redemanded."
16. See Anticipatory Breach In Louisiana, supra note 1, at 597. Interestingly,
the supreme court in Aronson had not even talked in terms of anticipatory breach,
but rather had based its decision on the theory that the act of sale was a suspensive
condition to the defendant's liability on the note, and by refusing to pass the act of
sale he made the condition impossible, and became immediately liable on the
contract. 143 So. at 389-90.
17. 234 La. 841, 101 So. 2d 689 (1958).
18. 5 S. WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 1337(A).
19. 234 La. at 856-58, 101 So. 2d at 694-95. There are two bases for terming the
court's conclusion inaccurate: (1) specific performance, not damages, is
Louisiana's major remedy for breach of contract, even for obligations to do, (2) this
was not an obligation to do, but an obligation to give. See materials cited in notes
25-26, infra. It should also be noted here that plaintiff did not file an immediate suit
prior to the term for performance. In fact the suit was filed over three years after
the alleged breach, and the court had to grapple with defendant's plea of liberative
prescription. Thus in analyzing the case as an anticipatory repudiation, the court did
not decide whether an anticipatory breach gives an injured promisee an immediate
cause of action in Louisiana.
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analyzed the doctrine of anticipatory breach. 20 The author concluded that
anticipatory breach is consistent with most of the basic principles of
Louisiana obligations law. Moreover, the author indicated that Marek and
similar Louisiana cases had effectively imported this common law doc-
trine, and agreed with the Marek court's statement that damages are the
preferred remedy for breach of contract in Louisiana.2 Thus, once again,
the problem of reconciling specific performance and anticipatory breach
was pretermitted by declaring that the preferred remedy for breach of
contract is the award of damages.
Many Louisiana courts have said that the preferred remedy for breach
of contract, at least of obligations to do, is damages.22 This conclusion is
often based on what is considered a careful reading of articles 1926 and
1927 of the Civil Code in pari materia.23 Courts have often held that
Article 1927 plainly declares that the breach of an obligation to do or not to
do entitles the party aggrieved in ordinary cases to damages; specific
performance is allowed only where damages would not furnish adequate
compensation and where the defaulting party can perform. 24 However,
Litvinoff has suggested that the proper interpretation of articles 1926 and
1927, and the most definitive statement on specific performance of con-
tracts, was made by Justice Provosty in Girault v. Feucht.25 In a case
involving obligations to do arising from a bilateral promise of sale of
immovable property, the Louisiana court asserted that the parties to such a
contract are "entitled" to specific performance. 26
20. See The Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach of Contract, supra note 1, at 119.
21. Id. at 125-26, 133.
22. See Pratt v. McCoy, 128 La. 570, 54 So. 1012 (1911), and the numerous
authorities cited therein.
23. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1926: "On the breach of any obligation to do, or not to
do the obligee is entitled either to damages, or, in cases which permit it, to specific
performance of the contract, at his option, or he may require the dissolution of the
contract, and in all these cases damages may lie given where they have accrued,
according to the rules established in the following section."
Id. art. 1927: "In ordinary cases, the breach of such a contract entitles the
party aggrieved only to damages, but where this would be an inadequate compensa-
tion, and the party has the power of performing the contract, he may be constrained
to a specific performance by means prescribed in the laws which regulate the
practice of the courts."
24. Marek v. McHardy, 234 La. 841, 856-57, 101 So. 2d 689, 694-95; Pratt v.
McCoy, 128 La. 570, 617, 54 So. 1012, 1029-30.
25. 117 La. 276, 41 So. 572 (1906). See 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 121.
26. 117 La. at 280-81, 41 So. at 573-74. The court said:
According to article 1926 the obligee is 'entitled' to damages or specific
performance 'at his option,' and according to article 1927 he is 'entitled' only to
damages in ordinary cases, 'but may' be awarded specific performance in cases
1977]
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The importance of this decision cannot be overemphasized, for even
though the leading case of McDonald v. Aubert27 had already recognized
the right to claim recta via (by specific performance) the delivery of a
thing, the specific performance of other obligations to do had been denied
in very general terms. Before Girault Louisiana courts at times would say
that specific performance is not a matter of right, but that its use rests in
the discretion of the court.28 Consequently, the failure of prior decisions to
make proper distinctions and their use of general language full of equity
overtones had created uncertainty. 29
If Girault v. Feucht correctly interpreted the law of specific perform-
ance, the Louisiana courts have needlessly strayed from this basic tenet of
the civil law. The courts have misinterpreted the law of specific perform-
ance not only by trying to justify the doctrine of anticipatory breach, but
also by overemphasizing the principle that the law will not force someone
to do something against his will. Thus, if a contractor repudiates his
contract to build, the courts have invariably refused to say that he must
build, and have instead granted general damages.3" However, Louisiana
courts could decree a sterner judgment more consistent with specific
performance whereby the contractor would be given the option either to
perform or to pay for the entire cost of the job as performed by another.3
where damages would be inadequate relief. Reading these two articles to-
gether, that is to say, reading the word 'may' in conjunction with the twice used
word 'entitled,' to which it stands in co-relation, the word 'may' must be given,
we think, the meaning of shall, and the articles must read that, where damages
are inadequate relief, the court, not 'may' but 'shall' or 'must,' order specific
performance. If the obligee is 'entitled' to a thing, the court has no discretion
about according it to him or not, but is obliged to do so. The sole question is
therefore, as to whether in this case damages would be adequate relief.
Evidently, in our opinion it would not be. The plaintiff is entitled to have
this particular piece of property, and the measure of his right is this property.
The court cannot take upon itself to say that anything short of this property will
satisfy his demand. Such a thing might be as that damages to the full market
value of this property would be as nothing to him, as compared with having the
property itself.
27. 17 La. 448 (1841).
28. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 121. See Caperton v. Forrey, 49 La. Ann.
872, 21 So. 600 (1897); Mirandona v. Burg, 49 La. Ann. 656, 21 So. 723 (1897);
Laroussini v. Werlein, 48 La. Ann. 13, 18 So. 704 (18%); City of New Orleans v.
New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 44 La. Ann. 64, 10 So. 401 (1892); Citizens' Bank v.
James, 26 La. Ann. 264 (1874).
29. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 121.
30. City of New Orleans v. New Orleans & N.E.R.R., 44 La. Ann. 64, 10 So.
401.
31. LA. CODE Ctv. PRO. art. 2502 lists the remedies available to a party entitled
to specific performance when the defendant refuses to comply. Article 2503 pro-
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If the foundation of the law of obligations is to hold people accountable for
their promises, then specific performance of obligations is necessary. In
Girault Justice Provosty simply said that the court cannot say that any-
thing short of the property contracted for will satisfy plaintiff's demand;
that damages to the full market value of this property would be nothing to
him, as compared with having the property itself.
32
Against this background an immediate suit for specific performance
in the case of an anticipatory breach is a perfectly logical and equitable
remedy. Despite the argument of some commentators that such a suit
would violate article 2052 of the Civil Code,33 an immediate suit for
specific performance would merely ask for a judgment ordering a specific
performance when the term arrives and would not accelerate the contract's
term. 34 In the case of a sale, an immediate suit might have 'the further
advantage of allowing the plaintiff to enjoin the vendor from selling the
contracted goods or property to a third party. Viewed in this light, the
doctrine of anticipatory breach fits well into the scheme of Louisiana
obligations law.
Despite the logic of allowing an immediate suit for specific perform-
ance for contracts which have been anticipatorily breached, the require-
ment of placing the obligor in default still presents problems. The chief
question raised is whether an anticipatory breach can be viewed as an
active breach, for which no placing in default is required. 35 If an anticipat-
ory breach is merely a passive breach, then an immediate suit could not be
entertained, for the obligee would have to remain ready and willing to
vides for the procedures for the execution of the writ of distringas. Article 2504
provides: "If a judgment directs a party to perform a specific act, and he fails to
comply within the time specified, the court may direct the act to be done by the
sheriff or some other person appointed by the court, at the cost of the disobedient
party, and with the same effect as if done by the party." (Emphasis added). For a
more complete discussion of specific performance of obligations to do and not to
do, see 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 168-69, where Professor Litvinoff reaches
the conclusion that the Louisiana law offers a carefully designed system of enforce-
ment techniques to obtain performance in specific form of obligations to do or not
to do. See also Comment, Louisiana Law of Specific Performance: Codal Provi-
sions and Methods of Enforcement, 40 TUL. L. REV. 340, 355 (1966).
32. Girault v. Feucht, 117 La. 276, 281, 41 So. 572, 574.
33. For the text of article 2052, see note 15, supra.
34. In any event judicial backlog will cause a judgment to be rendered in most
cases after the expiration of the term for performance.
35. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1932-33. The application of these principles to various
kinds of breaches of contract has often been extremely difficult and inconsistent
because article 1931, which defines active and passive violations of contracts, is far
from clear.
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perform until the date of performance, at which time he would have to
place the obligor in default if he refuses to perform.3 6
An active breach has been defined in various ways and may occur in a
wide variety of situations. The courts have said that if placing the obligor
in default would be a vain and useless act, the obligor has actively
breached his contract and has automatically fallen into default. 37 At times
the nature of the obligation suffices to show that an act of the obligor is an
active breach, as when he does an act which he is obligated not to do. At
other times, the obligor may do an act so clearly inconsistent with the
obligation he has contracted to do, that an active breach is manifest, as
when the obligor sells to a third party property which he has contracted to
sell to the obligee.38
In interpreting their Code's provisions on active breach, the French
courts have successfully developed a doctrine of implied or accessory
negative obligation. 39 According to this doctrine, in every obligation there
is an implied correlative obligation not to do something inconsistent with
that obligation.' If, for example, a party contracts to buy exclusively from
a certain supplier, he automatically places himself under the negative
obligation not to buy from another, and violates this obligation at the
moment, and by the mere fact, of buying from another. Thus the obligor
who does what he has impliedly contracted not to do has actively breached
his contract, and the obligee is under no duty to place him in default. This
principle could be applied in Louisiana under the theory that an anticipat-
ory repudiation is an act which the obligor has impliedly obligated himself
not to do, thus obviating the requirement of placing the obligor in de-
fault. 4'
36. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1933. The Marek court recognized but failed to resolve
this issue. The court stated that if the doctrine of anticipatory breach is entitled to
recognition, then an anticipatory repudiation of a contract is an active breach which
requires no putting in default on the part of the obligee. However, the court should
have said that if an anticipatory repudiation is an active breach of contract, then the
legal consequence of the doctrine of anticipatory breach, an immediate suit with no
necessity for putting in default, deserves recognition.
37. See Elliot v. Dupuy, 242 La. 173, 135 So. 2d 54 (1961); Woolie v. Carson
Carbon Co., 177 La. 990, 149 So. 551 (1933); Voss v. Roach, 35 So. 2d 142 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1948).
38. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 233.
39. Code Civil art. 1145: "Where there is an obligation not to do, the one who
violates it owes damages by the mere fact of the violation." Cf. LA. CIv. CODE art.
1932.
40. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 234.
41. See id.
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Moreover, none of the purposes of putting the obligor in default is
advanced when the obligation imposes abstention or forbearance on the
obligor. An obligation not to do is insusceptible of delayed performance,
and the obligor violates his duty upon doing whatever he promised not to
do. Such a defaulting obligor is in no position to request a period of grace
to avoid the payment of damages, and certainly he should not be surprised
at being sued immediately for specific performance of the repudiated
obligation.42
Article 1931 of the Louisiana Civil Code defines an active breach as
the doing of something inconsistent with the obligation. An inconsistent
act has been interpreted as "any deliberate act of the obligor that renders
him unable to perform or that so diminishes his ability to perform that a
performance would be no longer of value for the obligee . . . . "
Although an anticipatory repudiation does not fall very neatly within this
definition, Litvinoff points out that "the obligor, even without having
done anything inconsistent with the obligation, may simply advise the
obligee that he will not perform, and that such a declaration by the obligor
is in itself inconsistent with his duty to perform." I French doctrine and
jurisprudence agree that an obligee is relieved from putting in default an
obligor who communicates his refusal to perform. 4' For the same reasons,
Louisiana courts have held that no putting in default is necessary when the
obligor refuses to comply with the contract, denies the existence of the
contract, or denies that a particular obligation is imposed upon him.
46
42. Id. Litvinoff points out that "this approach of the negative obligation not to
do is useful in doubtful situations where fairness may demand that the obligor not
be allowed to avail himself of the technicality of putting in default." A few
Louisiana cases can be explained as a result of this approach. See Noel Estate, Inc.
v. Louisiana Oil Refining Corp., 188 La. 45, 175 So. 744 (1937) (abandoning the
premises regarded as an active violation by the lessee of the obligation not to
abandon them implied in his obligation to carry out the terms of the lease); Levy v.
M. Schwartz & Bro., 34 La. Ann. 209 (1882) (delivery of a defective press); Cable v.
Leeds & Co., 6 La. Ann. 293 (1851) (making and delivery of a crank unfit for the use
for which it was designed). French doctrine and courts strive to minimize the
requirement of putting the obligor in default, or simply to do away with it entirely,
at least for the recovery of compensatory damages. 6 R. DEMOGUE, TRAIT DES
OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL 274 (1931).
43. 2 S. LITvINOFF, supra note 10, § 235.
44. Id. at § 236.
45. See id.
46. Id. See Elliot v. Dupuy, 242 La. 173, 135 So. 2d 54 (1961); Stockelback v.
Bradley, 159 La. 336, 105 So. 363 (1925); Johnson v. Levy, 122 La. 118, 47 So. 422
(1908); Jones v. Whittington, 171 So. 2d 764 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965). See also
Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird Co., 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144 (1952),
where the court held that once defendant notified plaintiff that it was cancelling the
1977]
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Thus it becomes apparent that the civil law concept of putting in default is
no bar to the acceptance of the doctrine of anticipatory breach in Louisia-
na. An active violation of a contract in Louisiana is equivalent to an
anticipatory breach at common law and should be controlled by article
1932, requiring no putting in default,4 7 a conclusion confirmed by the
Louisiana jurisprudence .48
However, the question still remains whether an obligee has the
absolute right to terminate his performance upon notice of anticipatory
breach on the obligor's part. Certainly cases will arise when an obligee
will consider the contract at an end and will choose not to sue for specific
performance or even damages. The obligor should not be able to take
advantage of his own default by instituting a suit against the obligee who
has discontinued his performance, although it is arguable that the obligee
has breached his own obligation by discontinuing performance without
suing for dissolution. 49 The injustice of such a situation is obvious and can
be avoided by interpreting article 2047 in light of articles 1912 and 1932 to
conclude that an active violation is an exception to the requirement that the
obligee sue for dissolution. 50 Since an anticipatory breach is an active
breach, the party receiving the repudiation may consider the contract
dissolved by his own initiative without incurring liability, subject only, of
course, to proof of the anticipatory breach.
The instant case illustrates the misunderstanding of the doctrine of
anticipatory breach in Louisiana and typifies the confusion caused by a
failure to use precise terms. The opinion is short, and the language of the
court is simple and straightforward, but the court lumps together legal
contract no putting in default was necessary, regardless of whether the cancellation
was considered an active or passive breach.
47. "A situation that would be characterized as an anticipatory breach at
common law can be regarded as an active violation of the contract in Louisiana, and
therefore no act of the obligee is required for the obligor to be found in default." 2
S. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 238.
48. See Marek v. McHardy, 234 La. 841, 101 So. 2d 689 (1958); Friedman Iron
& Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird Co., 222 La. 627, 63 So. 2d 144 (1953); Seaton v.
Second Mun., 3 La. Ann. 44 (1848).
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2047: "In all cases the dissolution of a contract may be
demanded by suit or by exception; and when the resolutory condition is an event,
not depending on the will of either party, the contract is dissolved of right; but, in
other cases, it must be sued for, and the party in default may, according to
circumstances, have a further time allowed for the performance of the condition."
50. 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 10, § 287. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1912: "The effects
of being put in default are not only that, in contracts to give, the thing, which is the
object of the stipulation, is at the risk of the person in default; but in cases
hereinafter provided for it is a prerequisite to the recovery of damages and of
profits and fruits, or to the rescission of the contract."
[Vol. 38
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concepts in a somewhat baffling manner. The pertinent defenses to the suit
for specific performance were that plaintiff had failed to place defendant in
default, 5' and that plaintiff had failed to obtain a right-of-way to a public
road, a suspensive condition of the contract.
52
In response to the claim that defendant had not been placed in default,
the court noted that plaintiff had written a letter demanding performance,
and that defendant had replied that he did not consider the contract valid.
The court concluded that it would have been useless for plaintiff to make
any further demands on defendant, and cited Marek v. McHardy and the
subsequent law review comment " for the proposition that anticipatory
breach of contract is actionable in Louisiana. However, the citation of
these sources is somewhat odd, for although both impliedly stand for the
proposition that no putting in default is necessary in the case of an
anticipatory breach,54 neither argued for the availability of specific per-
formance in the case of an anticipatory breach. On the other hand, the
court in the instant case made no mention of article 1932 of the Civil Code
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1911(2):
The debtor may be put in default in three different ways: by the term
[terms] of the contract, by the act of the creditor or by the operation of law:
2. By the act of the party, when at or after the time stipulated for the
performance, he demands that it shall be carried into effect, which demand
may be made, either by the commencement of a suit, by a demand in writing,
by a protest made by a notary public, or by a verbal requisition made in the
presence of two witnesses.
See note 50, supra, for the text of article 1912.
LA. CIV. CODE art 1913: "In commutative contracts, where the reciprocal
obligations are to be performed at the same time, or the one immediately after the
other, the party who wishes to put the other in default, must, at the time and place
expressed in, or implied by the agreement, offer or perform, as the contract
requires, that which on his part was to be performed, otherwise the opposite party
will not be legally put in default."
52. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2021: "Conditional obligations are such as are made to
depend on an uncertain event. If the obligation is not to take effect until the event
happens, it is a suspensive condition; if the obligation takes effect immediately, but
is liable to be defeated when the event happens, it is then a resolutory condition."
53. 344 So. 2d 1130 (1977).
54. The Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach of Contract, supra note 1, at 128-30.
This article briefly analyzed the possibility that an anticipatory breach might be
considered an active breach which requires no putting in default. Alternatively the
author argued that article 1913, one of the articles setting forth the requirements of
putting in default, should not be applied in the case of an anticipatory breach, "as
this article was presumably designed to prevent 'surprise suits' by injured parties.
Certainly a party who unjustifiedly manifests his intention not to go through with
his contractual obligation when it comes due should not be heard to complain that
he is surprised at being sued for breach of contract."
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and the possibility of categorizing an anticipatory breach as an active
breach which requires no putting in default.
In analyzing defendant's second line of defense, the court agreed
with the trial judge's observation that plaintiff had in fact acquired the
necessary rights-of-way. " If the court was of this mind, it is striking that
it ever digressed into a discussion of anticipatory breach, for once a
suspensive condition is performed the obligation takes effect; the time for
performance, although not expressly stated in the contract, has arrived.5 6
The plaintiff wrote a letter to defendant offering to perform his part of the
contract and thereby placed defendant in default if he failed to perform his
reciprocal obligation. Defendant's letter denouncing the validity of the
contract was a present, not an anticipatory, breach of contract. Having
adequately placed the defendant in default, plaintiff was entitled to insti-
tute a suit for damages, dissolution, or specific performance at any time
within the prescriptive period. 7
Since the instant case is not a case of anticipatory breach at all, it is
not surprising that the court did not have to contend with a claim that it is
illogical to allow a suit for specific performance of a contract prior to the
term for its performance. To defendant's claim that he had not been
properly placed in default the court should have replied either that defend-
ant had committed an active breach, which requires no putting in default,
or that plaintiff's letter had adequately placed defendant in default regard-
less of whether the breach was active or passive. Alternatively the court
could merely have said that Louisiana jurisprudence has recognized that
no putting in default is necessary when the obligor refuses to comply with
or denies the existence of the contract.5" If this had been a case of
55. The court also observed that defendant's real reason for trying to avoid the
contract was the dramatic decline in the price of timber shortly after the contract
was confected.
56. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2028: "The contract of which the condition forms a part
is, like all others, complete by the assent of the parties; the obligee has a right of
which the obligor can not deprive him; its exercise is only suspended, or may be
defeated, according to the nature of the condition."
Id art. 2038: "When an obligation has been contracted on condition that an
event shall happen within a limited time, the condition is considered as broken,
when the time has expired without the event having taken place. If there be no time
fixed, the condition may always be performed, and it is not considered as broken,
until it is become certain that the event will not happen."
57. See note 50, supra. Plaintiff's suit for specific performance was even
further substantiated by article 2462 of the Civil Code, which gives to either party
the right to enforce by specific performance a promise to sell.
58. See authorities cited in notes 44-46, supra.
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anticipatory breach, the court should have specifically held that an anti-
cipatory breach is an active breach which requires no putting in default and
that a suit for specific performance may be instituted immediately.
Michael D. Bewers
ALL IN THE FAMILY: EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IN
LOUISIANA SUCCESSION LAW
In Trimble v. GordonI the United States Supreme Court held that an
Illinois law prohibiting an illegitimate child from inheriting her father's
intestate succession, even though paternity had been judicially determined
prior to his death, violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. In Succession of Robins2 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that Civil Code article 1488 was in violation of article I, section 3 of the
Louisiana Constitution 3 insofar as it denied the right of a father to dispose
of his separate property by testament to his own adulterous, illegitimate
children. An analysis of these two cases in light of Louisiana codal law
and its history suggests the necessity for significant alteration of
Louisiana's succession law.
Louisiana's Civil Code provides for different civil, social and politic-
al rights based on differences of conditions existing between persons.4
Children are either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated5 depending on
whether they are born in or out of marriage. 6 Illegitimates are further
classified as those conceived of parents who, at the time of conception,
might have legally contracted marriage and those whose parents could not
then have married 7 (adulterous' and incestuous 9 bastards). Adulterous
1. 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
2. 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
3. "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws .... No law
shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person be-
cause of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations
.... LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
4. LA. CIv. CODE art. 24, as amended in 1921, now includes all differences
between persons. The original article referred only to differences based on sex. LA.
CIv. CODE art. 24 (1870) (as it appeared prior to the 1921 amendment).
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 178.
6. Id. arts. 179, 180.
7. Id. art. 181.
8. Id. art. 182.
9. Id. art. 183.
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